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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Appellant, Children's Seashore House ("CSH"), a 
Philadelphia hospital that until 1990 had been located in 
Atlantic City, New Jersey, provides acute medical 
rehabilitation care to seriously injured or ill pediatric 
patients. CSH brought this action in the district court on 
May 8, 1998, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to 
compel the New Jersey Department of Human Services to 
make disproportionate share hospital ("DSH") adjustments 
on account of CSH's treatment of Medicaid enrollees from 
New Jersey. In particular, CSH sued the commissioner of 
the Department and the director of its Division of Medical 
Assistance ("New Jersey") under 42 U.S.C.S 1983 in their 
official capacities to challenge New Jersey's amendment to 
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its Medicaid Plan effective September 20, 1996, which 
provides for the denial of DSH payments to hospitals 
located outside of New Jersey. CSH alleged that this policy 
violated CSH's rights under Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 1396 et seq. ("Medicaid Act"), and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
New Jersey asserts that it had made the DSH payments to 
out-of-state hospitals until July 1, 1993, but that thereafter 
while it was contemplating the amendment's adoption, it 
discontinued the payments. CSH contends, however, that 
New Jersey never made DSH payments to it after it moved 
to Philadelphia. 
 
On September 25, 1998, New Jersey filed a motion to 
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. On 
November 9, 1998, CSH filed a motion, which the district 
court referred to a magistrate judge, to amend its complaint 
to assert a claim under the Commerce Clause. The district 
court then decided the case in an opinion dated December 
7, 1998, in which it indicated that in its discretion it was 
determining the "matter as a motion to dismiss" which it 
granted. Of course, the district court therefore did not make 
a ruling on the motion for summary judgment, and neither 
the magistrate judge nor the district court ever ruled on 
CSH's motion to amend. CSH then appealed. 
 
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
 
In order that this matter be understood, we set forth the 
statutory background of the case. Medicaid is a joint 
federal-state program that provides for the payment of 
medical services pursuant to the Medicaid Act to the poor, 
elderly, and disabled. See Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 
171 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 1999). To participate, a state 
must submit a State Plan to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services and obtain its approval of the plan 
detailing how the state will disburse Medicaid money. Id. at 
846. A state may change its plan by obtaining approval of 
a State Plan Amendment. Id. The United States makes 
contributions to a state's program provided its plan is 
consistent with the applicable Medicaid Act provisions. 
 
Beginning in 1981, Congress provided additional 
payments for disproportionate share hospitals, meaning 
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hospitals serving a high percentage of indigent patients. 
The two provisions regarding DSH adjustments relevant to 
this case are 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(13)(A) ("a-13") and 42 
U.S.C. S 1396r-4 ("r-4"). A-13 provides for a public process 
through which a state determines and sets reimbursement 
rates, while r-4 outlines the specifications regarding DSH 
adjustments. As it now reads a-13 states in its entirety: 
 
       A State plan for medical assistance must -- 
 
       (13) provide -- 
 
       (A) for a public process for determination of rates of 
       payment under the plan for hospital services, 
       nursing facility services, and services of intermediate 
       care facilities for the mentally retarded under which 
       -- 
 
        (i) proposed rates, the methodologies underlying 
       the establishment of such rates, and justifications 
       for the proposed rates are published, 
 
        (ii) providers, beneficiaries and their 
       representatives, and other concerned State 
       residents are given a reasonable opportunity for 
       review and comment on the proposed rates, 
       methodologies, and justifications, 
 
        (iii) final rates, the methodologies underlying the 
       establishment of such rates, and justifications for 
       such final rates are published, and 
 
        (iv) in the case of hospitals, such rates take into 
       account (in a manner consistent with [r-4]) the 
       situation of hospitals which serve a 
       disproportionate number of low-income patients 
       with special needs . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). 
 
When Congress adopted the current version of a-13 in 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 it repealed the following 
language, commonly known as the Boren Amendment, that 
stated: 
 
       A State plan for medical assistance must -- 
 
       (13) provide -- 
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       (A) for payment (except where the State agency is 
       subject to an order under section 1396m of this title) 
       of the hospital services, nursing facility services, and 
       services in an intermediate care facility for the 
       mentally retarded provided under the plan through 
       the use of rates . . . which, in the case of hospitals 
       . . . which serve a disproportionate number of low 
       income patients with special needs . . . which the 
       State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to 
       the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet 
       the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and 
       economically operated facilities in order to provide 
       care and services in conformity with applicable State 
       and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety 
       standards. . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(13)(A) (West 1992) (repealed) 
(emphasis added). 
 
Both the Boren Amendment and the 1997 amendment to 
a-13 are cross referenced with r-4. Thus, while r-4 
continues to set the parameters for a state's provision of 
DSH adjustments, Congress in amending a-13 replaced the 
Boren Amendment's language requiring a state to pay 
"reasonable and adequate" rates with language mandating 
that a state provide a "public process" by which rates are 
determined in accordance with r-4. See Children's Hosp. 
and Health Ctr. v. Belshe, 188 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 
A State Plan must provide for payment for covered 
services supplied by out-of-state hospitals to the state's 
own Medicaid program enrollees. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 1396a(a)(16); 42 C.F.R. S 431.52(b); West Virginia Univ. 
Hosps. Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 29 (3d Cir. 1989), aff'd 
on other grounds, 499 U.S. 83, 111 S.Ct. 1138 (1991). 
Moreover, it is clear that if Congress had not repealed the 
Boren Amendment in 1997, we would be bound to follow 
the holdings in West Virginia v. Casey that a state cannot 
set disproportionately low rates for out-of-state hospital 
services rendered -- including DSH adjustments-- for its 
Medicaid enrollees merely because the hospital is an out-of- 
state provider and that the out-of-state hospitals can 
enforce their rights to appropriate treatment. Id. at 17-22, 
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28-29; see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n , 496 U.S. 
498, 110 S.Ct. 2510 (1990). But inasmuch as we based 
West Virginia v. Casey on our conclusion that 
 771<!>Pennsylvania's denial of adjustments to out-of-state 
 
hospitals violated the "reasonable and adequate" 
requirement of a-13 as it then existed, see 885 F.2d at 29, 
we now must determine whether Congress's removal of the 
"reasonable and adequate" language from a-13 requires a 
different result than that we reached in West Virginia v. 
Casey. Inasmuch as we conclude that the repeal of the 
Boren Amendment does require a result different from that 
in West Virginia v. Casey so that CSH cannot prevail on its 
direct statutory claim, we must decide whether its equal 
protection claim should have survived New Jersey's motion 
to dismiss. 
 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION 
 
As we stated above, the district court dismissed CSH's 
complaint on New Jersey's motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6).1 The court held that CSH lacks standing to 
bring its statutory claim because Congress intended to 
foreclose private enforcement of DSH adjustment payments 
when it repealed the Boren Amendment in 1997, and 
because r-4 itself did not confer standing on CSH. Applying 
the test the Supreme Court set forth in Blessing v. 
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (1997), the court 
recognized that hospitals like CSH are the intended 
beneficiaries of r-4. The court reasoned, however, that while 
r-4 mandates that a state's Medicaid plan provide for an 
appropriate increase in Medicaid payments to DSHs based 
on specific rate adjustment procedures, unlike the Boren 
Amendment r-4 "does not mandate actual payment." 
Accordingly, the court held that r-4 "does not impose a 
binding obligation on New Jersey to actually afford CSH 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. New Jersey indicated that it was moving to dismiss pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(c). Rule 12(c), however, deals with motions for judgment on 
the pleadings. As a practical matter, however, in the context of this case 
there is no real distinction between the two types of motions. See 
Churchill v. Star Enter., 183 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, 
inasmuch as the district court treated the motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 
standards, we will as well. 
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payment, such that CSH has a federal right to payment 
under S 1983." Moreover, the court found that Congress's 
repeal of the Boren Amendment supported this conclusion 
as Congress eliminated the statutory provision mandating 
"reasonable and adequate" payment that had been regarded 
as conferring standing upon plaintiffs in the past. The court 
found its conclusions buttressed by statements of 
congressional intent to eliminate causes of action for 
hospitals and nursing facilities challenging the adequacy of 
the rates they receive.2 
 
When the court addressed CSH's equal protection claim, 
it held that CSH could not maintain a valid claim because 
(1) the Medicaid Act does not "specifically" require states to 
fund out-of-state DSHs; (2) New Jersey was not treating 
CSH differently than it treated any other out-of-state 
hospital; and (3) the federal government had approved New 
Jersey's current Medicaid plan, including its policy not to 
provide for DSH adjustments to out-of-state hospitals, as 
conforming with Medicaid's requirements. Nevertheless, the 
court believed that its ruling was in tension with our 
rejection of what it called "Pennsylvania's alleged rational 
basis for excluding out of state hospitals from its Medicaid 
program" in West Virginia v. Casey, 885 F.2d at 29. But the 
court distinguished that case by pointing out that while 
"the West Virginia hospital which brought suit served an 
extremely high number of Pennsylvania residents," "[CSH's] 
complaint makes no such [equivalent] allegation. . . ." 
Accordingly, the court dismissed CSH's equal protection 





CSH argues that the district court failed to recognize that 
r-4 authorizes actions to enforce DSH adjustments because 
r-4 delineates rights established by Congress for the 
specific benefit of DSHs and obligates the states to make 
supplemental payments to these hospitals. CSH contends 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The court also held that Medicaid's public notice provisions do not 
confer standing because they "are less than specific, mandatory 
requirements." CSH does not challenge this conclusion on this appeal. 
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that, in repealing the Boren Amendment, Congress did not 
repeal the requirement in r-4 mandating payment of 
adjustments to DSHs, but actually fortified the states' 
obligations to these providers. According to CSH, the 
court's assessment of the legislative history was erroneous, 
as the court relied upon statements concerning versions of 
the 1997 amendment to the Medicaid Act that Congress 
later changed and in any case did not address enforcement 
of the DSH provisions. 
 
Additionally, CSH asserts that it has alleged a viable 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 claim under the Equal Protection and 
Commerce Clauses. CSH contends that if viewed under 
either heightened or rational-basis scrutiny, the denial of 
benefits to hospitals based upon their domiciles violates 
both clauses. Finally, CSH contends that the district court's 
reliance on federal approval of New Jersey's plan cannot 
support its result. 
 
We will affirm the district court's order dismissing CSH's 
statutory claim seeking to enforce the Medicaid Act with 
respect to DSH payments in light of the passage of the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 amending a-13. We, however, 
will reverse the order of dismissal to the extent that it 
dismissed the equal protection claim and will remand the 
case to the district court for further consideration of that 
claim as well as CSH's motion for leave to amend its 
complaint to assert a Commerce Clause claim. 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
We exercise plenary review over the district court's order 
granting the motion to dismiss. See McClintock v. 
Eichelberger, 169 F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 
S.Ct. 182 (1999). Furthermore, we must consider all factual 
allegations pled in the complaint as true and can affirm the 
district court's order of dismissal only if we are certain that 
CSH cannot prove any set of facts in support of its claim 
that would entitle it to relief. Moreover, regarding CSH's 
equal protection claim, "[s]ince this is aS 1983 action, [CSH 
is] entitled to relief if [its] complaint sufficiently alleges 
deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution. In 
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we do not inquire 
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whether [CSH] will ultimately prevail, only whether [it is] 
entitled to offer evidence to support [its] claims." Nami v. 
Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
 
B. CHS's Statutory Claim to Enforce the Disproportionate 
Share Adjustments 
 
CSH argues that even if Congress's passage of the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 eliminated its ability under a- 
13 to enforce the DSH adjustments, nevertheless a court 
can enforce the adjustments under r-4. As noted above, the 
district court rejected this argument because it reasoned 
that r-4 does not impose a binding obligation on states to 
pay the adjustments. A-13 now mandates that a state 
provide for "a public process" for determination of rates. 
The process requires publication of the proposed rates 
together with the methodologies and justifications used to 
establish to those rates. Providers, beneficiaries, and other 
concerned state residents must be given a reasonable 
opportunity for review of and comment on the proposed 
rates, methodologies and justifications. Then thefinal rates, 
as well as methodologies and justifications for the rates, 
must be published. Finally, the rates must take into 
account the situation of DSHs in a manner consistent with 
r-4. See 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(13)(A). 
 
In Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. at 340-41, 117 S.Ct. at 
1359 (citations omitted), the Supreme Court said that a 
federal statute gives rise to a privately enforceable right if a 
court finds all three of the following circumstances present: 
 
       First, Congress must have intended that the provision 
       in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff 
       must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected 
       by the statute is not so `vague and amorphous' that its 
       enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, 
       the statute must unambiguously impose a binding 
       obligation on the States. 
 
We think it is clear that by amending a-13 in 1997, 
Congress eliminated the Boren Amendment's requirement 
that a state must provide for and assure the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services that its rates are "reasonable 
and adequate." As we recognized in Rite Aid v. Houstoun, 
 
                                9 
  
the Boren Amendment set procedural and substantive 
requirements: "The Boren Amendment instructed state 
agencies to make findings and assurances that their 
Medicaid reimbursement rates promote economy, efficiency, 
quality of care, and equal access. . . ." 171 F.3d at 852. Yet, 
by replacing the Boren Amendment with a requirement that 
a state establish a public process by which its rates would 
be determined, Congress has removed a party's ability to 
enforce any substantive right. See HCMF Corp. v. Gilmore, 
26 F. Supp.2d 873, 880 (W.D. Va. 1998) ("With the repeal 
of the Boren Amendment nothing remains that remotely 
resembles a federal right to reasonable and adequate rates. 
There is no federal statutory language to parse. There is 
only a state standard. It follows that there can be no 
prospective relief under S 1396a(a)(13). . . ."). 
 
The legislative history confirms this reading of the 
statute. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-217 (1997), reprinted in 
1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176, 488, begins its discussion of the 
proposed change to a-13 with this description of the law 
under the Boren Amendment: 
 
       Under so-called Boren amendments, states are 
       required to pay hospitals, nursing facilities, and 
       intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded 
       (ICFs/MR) rates that are `reasonable and adequate' to 
       cover the costs which must be incurred by `efficiently 
       and economically operated facilities.' A number of 
       courts found that state systems failed to meet the test 
       of `reasonableness' and some states have had to 
       increase payments to these providers. 
 
The conference agreement, which became the new a-13, 
according to the report "[r]epeals the Boren amendments 
and establishes a public process under which proposed 
rates, methodologies underlying the rates and the 
justifications for such rates are published and subject to 
public review and comment, and final rates are published 
with underlying methodologies and justifications." Id. at 
489. 
 
Thus, unless r-4 establishes an enforceable right on its 
own, CSH does not have an enforceable statutory claim. 
Yet, r-4 imposes neither procedural nor substantive 
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requirements on a state that provide a basis for CSH to 
press its claims. Rather, r-4 is a definitional provision that 
describes certain procedures that a state must satisfy, such 
as submitting a qualifying plan to the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services by a certain date to establish an 
adequate state disproportionate share hospital adjustment 
plan. 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-4(a). Moreover, r-4 sets the 
parameters of what is a DSH, what constitutes an adequate 
payment adjustment, and what limits are placed on federal 
financial participation and on state allotments for each 
year. We are satisfied that CSH cannot predicate its claim 
on these provisions. For this reason, we will affirm the 
district court's dismissal of CSH's section 1983 statutory 
claim and its finding that CSH cannot successfully 
maintain an action to enforce the Medicaid Act with respect 
to DSH adjustments.3 
 
C. Equal Protection 
 
CSH claims that New Jersey's policy discriminates on its 
face against out-of-state hospitals in favor of domestic 
enterprises.4 The Supreme Court has held that according to 
equal protection jurisprudence, "whatever the extent of a 
State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing 
business within its boundaries, that authority does not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. CSH cites Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe , 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 684 (1998), Rite Aid v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 
842, and Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998), for the 
proposition that "[t]he Boren Amendment is only one of several 
provisions of the Medicaid Act on which providers have based S 1983 
claims." Brief at 14. While this is true, none of these cases was 
predicated upon the current version of a-13 or upon r-4. Moreover, these 
cases are all distinguishable from the current situation because each of 
them rested upon different provisions of the Medicaid Act that "unlike r- 
4" have a substantive or procedural requirement. 
 
4. CSH argues that this denial rises to the level of burdening a 
fundamental right and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny. However, 
inasmuch as CSH concentrates its argument upon a rational basis 
model of equal protection, we will as well. In any event, we have no need 
at this time to determine whether this is a strict scrutiny case because 
CSH's complaint survives a motion to dismiss in which only a rational 
basis justification is implicated. 
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justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens 
on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic 
corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and 
domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 
470 U.S. 869, 875, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 1680 (1985) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).5 
 
As we noted above, the district court rested its rejection 
of CSH's equal protection claim upon its belief that federal 
law does not require New Jersey to pay out-of-state 
hospitals because of federal approval of New Jersey's 
Medicaid plan including New Jersey's express statement 
that it would not provide for adjustments to out-of-state 
providers, and because the "current Medicaid statute does 
not specifically require States to fund DSH facilities outside 
their own borders." The court distinguished West Virginia v. 
Casey on the ground that "the West Virginia hospital which 
brought suit served an extremely high number of 
Pennsylvania residents." Moreover, the court thought that it 
was significant that New Jersey was not treating CSH 
differently than other hospitals outside of that state. 
 
New Jersey in a supplemental letter brief urges that we 
affirm the district court's order dismissing the equal 
protection claim for the following reasons: 
 
       First, New Jersey does not have sufficient information 
       and data with which to determine whether an out-of- 
       state hospital is entitled to DSH payments under the 
       varying rules for making the determination. Indeed, as 
       set forth in the State's main brief, any state can treat 
       any hospital as a DSH hospital. Second, it would be an 
       onerous task for New Jersey to monitor whether an 
       out-of-state hospital has already been fully 
       compensated by either its home state or other states 6 in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Likewise, the courts consider discriminatory treatment based upon a 
citizen's state of residence a potential violation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. See Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 118 
S.Ct. 766, 774 (1998) ("Where nonresidents are subject to different 
treatment, there must be reasonable ground for . . . diversity of 
treatment.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
6. This assumes that if all states were required to make DSH payments 
to out-of-state hospitals, other states may also be obligated to make DSH 
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       accordance with 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-4(g), which limits 
       the amount of DSH payments an individual hospital is 
       entitled to receive. 
 
       Third, as now codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-4(f), 
       states' DSH allotments were changed so that set 
       amounts are provided for each year beginning with 
       Fiscal Year 1998. Clearly Congress reached a decision 
       about how much each individual state was entitled to 
       receive and there is no evidence that it considered, in 
       its calculation, that a state may be required to give 
       away significant portions of its DSH allotment to other 
       states, particularly given the significant lobbying by the 
       states which occurred prior to the final figures being 
       enacted into law. 
 
       Fourth, this calculation is further complicated 
       because it is not possible for New Jersey to anticipate 
       where its residents may ultimately receive care. The 
       statute either applies to out-of-state hospitals or it does 
       not; there is no basis to limit DSH payments only to 
       `border' hospitals. 
 
       Fifth, once a hospital qualifies for a DSH payment, 
       the hospital can use that money for any purpose, even 
       non-medical purposes, because DSH payments are not 
       payments for services provided. Nor would the hospital 
       be required to even use the money received from New 
       Jersey on New Jersey patients. 
 
       Lastly, out-of-state hospitals already receive DSH 
       payments from the home state covering care provided 
       to out-of-state residents. The home state is required to 
       take into account treatment of out-of-state indigent 
       patients when determining whether a hospital qualifies 
       for DSH payments and how much DSH that hospital is 
       entitled to receive. 
 
       Section 1923(b)(2) of the Act bases the Medicaid 
       utilization rate on a formula that includes patient 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
payments to a particular hospital. For example, a hospital could claim a 
DSH payment from any state as long as it treated at least one resident 
from that state. [This footnote is quoted from the letter brief.] 
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       days furnished to patients eligible for Medicaid 
       . . . [t]he State must consider the total number of 
       patient days attributable to Medicaid recipients 
       regardless of which state would be responsible for 
       payment for the service. This is to ensure that each 
       hospital that meets the . . . [DSH] requirement[s] is 
       accorded disproportionate share status regardless of 
       the origin of those patients. Id. [55 Fed. Reg. at 
       10079 (emphasis added)]. 
 
       It is unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended 
       to have both other states and the home state count the 
       same patient days, and reimburse for the same patient 
       days. These six reasons for New Jersey's denial of out- 
       of-state DSH payments more than satisfies the rational 
       relationship test. 
 
In our view, the district court's rationales cannot support 
a dismissal of the action. The absence of a provision in the 
Medicaid Act requiring that states fund DSH facilities 
outside their borders does not mean that a state 
constitutionally can differentiate between in-state and out- 
of-state facilities. Rather, it means simply that there is no 
statutory requirement for equal treatment. Furthermore, 
federal approval of the amendment to the plan at most 
could foreclose a statutory argument challenging the denial 
of DSH payments. Moreover, the fact that New Jersey treats 
all out-of-state facilities equally by denying them DSH 
payments does not address the issue CSH raises as it is 
complaining about its treatment as compared to treatment 
of New Jersey facilities, not as compared to treatment of 
other out-of-state facilities. In the circumstances, we 
cannot uphold the district court's reasoning on why CSH 
has failed to allege a claim on which relief can be granted 
on the equal protection claim. 
 
Additionally, we cannot uphold the Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal on the basis of New Jersey's arguments that we 
quote above, as its contentions introduce matters into the 
case that go far beyond the complaint and even the 
pleadings as a whole and introduce factual questions which 
we cannot address at this time.7 In short, we are not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We realize that a court on a motion to dismiss can consider matters 
of public record, see Churchill v. Star Enter., 183 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 1999), but New Jersey's contentions go beyond that record. 
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satisfied from the complaint or even all the pleadings that 
CSH will not be able to prove any set of facts that will 
entitle it to relief. 
 
Accordingly, while we express no view on whether CSH 
ultimately will prevail on the equal protection claim, we 
think that the claim should have survived New Jersey's 
motion to dismiss. See also West Virginia v. Casey, 885 
F.2d at 29 ("Pennsylvania's excuse of administrative burden 
does not, in this case, provide a rational basis for[the 
hospital's] grossly diminished reimbursement rates."). 
Therefore, we will remand the case to the district court for 
further proceedings on that claim. On the remand CSH may 





For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of 
December 7, 1998, to the extent that it dismissed CSH's 
statutory claims but will reverse it to the extent that it 
dismissed the equal protection claim. We will remand the 
matter to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this decision. The parties will bear their 
own costs on this appeal. 
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